Even as regional leaders maintain ties with Israel, Arab public opinion is drifting further away—and the price could be high. Dr. Shira Efron urges Israel to adopt a new discourse, move beyond the outdated concept of a monolithic "Arab world," and opt for proactive diplomacy, mutual reconciliation, and cross-regional empathy in order to seize the strategic window of opportunity now open
Israel’s existence has long been a given in the Arab world. Egypt and Jordan signed stable peace agreements with Israel decades ago, and were later joined by the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan under the Abraham Accords. Flights to the Gulf operate around the clock, and Israeli tourists eagerly embraced the new destinations, happily swapping traditional Toblerone for Dubai chocolate. On the eve of October 7, Israel seemed on the verge of expanding these agreements—with Saudi Arabia at the top of the list.
October 7 marked a watershed moment for the Arab world as well. The attack brought the Palestinian issue back to the forefront and blocked further agreements that sought to bypass it. Dr. Shira Efron, an expert on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, head of research at the Israel Policy Forum and a consultant at the RAND Corporation, suggests that Israel should first begin speaking differently about “the Arab world.” It is not a single monolithic bloc, and there is a clear divide between the autocratic and monarchical regimes and their publics—who are exposed to pan-Arab media that broadcasts events in Gaza 24/7. Contrary to common belief, monarchies and autocracies are deeply reliant on public sentiment, even if elections don’t take place—or are merely symbolic.
Dr. Efron, what does Israel symbolize today in the Arab world?
"The Arab world is too diverse to be painted with a broad brush. Israel is no longer seen as the number one enemy, but it’s certainly not considered a natural partner. The Abraham Accords marked a turning point—a push toward warm relations between Israel and countries like the UAE, emphasizing economic and cultural cooperation, unlike the 'cold' peace (a peace devoid of full cooperation) with Egypt and Jordan. It’s important to remember: it’s been 46 years since the peace agreement with Egypt, and remarkably, to the best of our knowledge, President el-Sisi has not had even a phone call with Netanyahu since October 7—nor before that, for that matter—let alone a meeting or visit. That peace remains cold and nearly devoid of personal contact. That’s why so much effort went into ensuring the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements) would forge peace between peoples—not just governments. There was a euphoric message of 'We are all children of Abraham,' especially from the Emiratis, who showed genuine interest in a deep connection with Israel and have maintained it despite the war. But when it comes to public opinion, support remains low. Arab Barometer polling shows that in many Arab countries, the public does not support rapprochement with Israel. The events of October 7 renewed and intensified the negative image: while Israel sees itself as a victim, the Arab world sees it as a regional bully. Many regional leaders continue their relationships with Israel, formally or informally, but public opinion—never particularly pro-Israel—is now making it harder to develop ties openly."
"Beyond military capabilities, Israel has long been respected for its social cohesion, which had already begun to unravel before the strategic failure"
How was the October 7 failure and Israel's response perceived in the region?
"October 7 was met with deep shock in the Arab world. Many countries, even those not sympathetic to Hamas, were stunned to see Israel—long considered secure and technologically advanced—so gravely attacked. Beyond its military capabilities, Israel had long been admired for its social cohesion (a hallmark of its national resilience), which had already begun to deteriorate prior to the disaster. That said, Israel’s military response, which included successful operations and serious blows to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran—and indirectly led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria—restored Israel’s strategic standing. Still, the continued fighting and vague messaging about territorial intentions in Gaza and Syria are confusing and troubling to the region. Is Israel planning to expand? To reestablish settlements in Gaza? Additionally, the so-called 'voluntary emigration' plan for Gazans raises fears of another Nakba—especially in Egypt and Jordan, each concerned with issues close to home. Instead of a paradigm shift, a new tension has arisen—between regional respect and regional concern."
Is there any real internal discourse in Arab countries about the conflict’s complexity, or does public rhetoric simply align with the pro-Palestinian narrative?
"In Egypt and Jordan there is more nuanced knowledge, especially given their direct connection to Palestinian populations. But in places like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, knowledge is very limited—even among research institutes, which barely address the Palestinian issue. Professional discourse does exist, but it’s narrow and lacks a solid knowledge base. There is empathy for the Palestinian people, but not for their leadership, which is often seen as an obstacle to regional progress. Although the issue had been pushed aside over the years, October 7 brought it back to the center—driven by a desire to preserve Palestinian dignity and identity."
To what extent does public opinion in the Arab world actually affect policymakers?
"Although many Arab countries are not democracies, public opinion still significantly impacts policymaking—especially in nations with a young population like Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman, for example, conducts frequent polling to monitor public sentiment—more than any other leader worldwide. He himself has said that his personal opinion doesn’t matter compared to the will of the people. Therefore, sensitive political moves, such as normalization with Israel, will only proceed if they don’t hurt his domestic standing. Since the public is largely not pro-Israel, public opinion becomes a central consideration in shaping foreign policy—even under non-elected regimes. By contrast, much of the discourse around what the Saudis want or whether normalization is possible despite the war is not constructive. Instead, we should focus on leveraging regional leaders’ desire to solve this problem, and see how we can engage the Arab world to support Israel’s legitimate security interests—which are not so different from theirs. As this war, which began in Gaza and expanded regionally, has shown—disarming Hamas, weakening the Muslim Brotherhood, implementing substantial reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and pressuring it to accept compromises. At the same time, it’s crucial to show Israelis the benefits of peace—and how broader regional agreements are inseparable from resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict."
"Although many Arab states are not democracies, public opinion significantly influences policy decisions—especially in countries with a young population like Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman, for example, frequently conducts polls to track public sentiment"
What could be the most surprising step Israel could take to shift the regional discourse?
"A pattern-breaking move from Israel—one that could shift the regional discourse—would be a meaningful step toward resolving the Palestinian issue. Historically, breakthroughs with the Arab world happened when this issue was front and center, like at the Madrid Conference or Oslo. Even the Abraham Accords were made possible by Israel’s commitment to refrain from annexing land beyond the Green Line. While full peace is not on the horizon, an honest Israeli declaration of intent to separate from the Palestinians—and not rule over them indefinitely—would be deeply meaningful. If such a move is accompanied by gradual disengagement instead of creeping annexation, it could bring Israel’s clandestine ties with Arab states into the open and shift regional perceptions—especially now that strategic interests already exist both above and below the surface."
What areas of shared interest could serve as a practical foundation for cooperation between Israel and the Arab world?
"There are clear regional interests: countering Iran’s influence, maritime security, climate change, food and water security, health, economy, renewable energy, and civilian technology. The region’s population is young—mostly under 35—and they are seeking a better future. Israel has much to offer in these areas, and many Arab states view this as strategically valuable. Cooperation in these fields already exists, but could grow significantly—if Israel signals a genuine turn toward a political resolution with the Palestinians. Without such a signal, even the most aligned interests may be squandered."
If you were advising Israel to adopt one strategic direction vis-à-vis the Arab world, what would it be?
"Israel’s strategic direction should combine advocacy, reconciliation, and initiative—not relying solely on media outreach or government-level security ties. Our experience with Egypt and Jordan shows that formal relations are not enough. Israel must seriously signal its intent to end the occupation and resolve the conflict—recognizing regional initiatives such as the Arab Peace Initiative—while safeguarding its own security and clarifying its needs, especially in the post-October 7 era. One-sided moves—like settlement expansion or annexation—and irresponsible political statements only erode trust. Respectful dialogue and genuine strategic partnership, alongside a clear message of willingness to reach a settlement, can restore trust and deepen relations with the region. I would also advise listening more closely to what many Arab countries are saying and identifying areas of shared interest, as well as their increasing willingness to help us deal with the Palestinian issue—more so than ever before. Alongside the risks that we all fear after October 7, there are countless opportunities being expressed both directly and indirectly."
And what is the cost of current policy?
"If Israel continues to act solely out of fear and strength—without demonstrating regional responsibility, understanding its partners’ needs, or offering a vision—it risks missing out on real strategic opportunities. In the past, the Arab world fiercely opposed Israel, but the Arab Peace Initiative reflected a shift—from 'no' to 'yes, under conditions.' Today, there are new windows of opportunity: Iran’s weakness and that of its allies, changes in Syria and Lebanon, and shared regional interests. A diplomatic discourse that fails to evolve or capitalize on this potential is a dangerous missed opportunity. The cost of cognitive blindness is not just diplomatic—it’s strategic: missed alliances, regional isolation, and the loss of an opportunity to rewrite the rules of the game. The opportunities are there—it’s up to us to seize them."
Dr. Shira Efron is the Head of Research at the Israel Policy Forum and Senior Fellow at RAND.
